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establishment,	the	narrative	changes	from	free	markets	to	political	risk	and	foreign	investor	need	for	protection.	The	OBM	and	the	hold-up	model	concentrate	only	on	the	promises	that	host	states	make	at	the	time	of	investment	but	may	ignore	later.				 Foreign	investment	relations,	in	sum,	are	not	as	clear	as	these	models	or	the	idea	of	pacta	sunt	servanda	suggests.	Governments	accept	some	conditions	explicitly	but	also	resist	some	demands	from	foreign	investors.	An	important	critique	to	the	OBM	and	the	hold-up	models	is	that	they	rely	on	an	abstract	conception	of	foreign	investment	bargains.	In	practice,	there	is	not	always	a	contract,	and	contracts	are	incomplete	by	definition.92	The	use	of	the	word	bargain,	in	other	words,	is	just	part	of	a	narrative.	The	establishment	of	an	investment	can	always	be	described	as	a	bargain	between	foreign	investor	and	host	state.	But	this	does	not	tell	us	much	about	the	nature	of	the	legal	relations	or	the	scope	of	the	emerging	rights	and	duties.	Did	the	host	state	explicitly	agree	to	provide	an	incentive?	Or	did	it	just	convince	the	foreign	investor	to	establish	in	that	new	strategic	sector?	A	restrictive	or	expansive	interpretation	of	these	bargains	can	have	major	legal	implications.	For	doctrines	like	acquired	rights,	vested	rights,	or	legitimate	expectations,	this	could	be	the	difference	between	a	decision	in	favor	of	the	foreign	investor,	or	of	the	host	state.	 		 For	investment	tribunals,	states	must	keep	their	promises	to	foreign	investors.	This	is	the	main	mission	of	the	international	investment	regime.	But	a	problem	of	fetishizing	pacta	sunt	servanda	is	that	this	disregards	the	indeterminate	nature	of	foreign	investor	rights.	These	rights	are	the	result	of	intense	negotiations	and	remain	subject	to	interpretation.	When	deciding	a	dispute,	arbitrators	inevitably	face	this	problem.	They	can	interpret	foreign	investor	rights	according	to	domestic	law,	or	fully	embrace	a	transactional	approach.	The	first	solution	implies	looking	for	answers	in	the	ground	rules	created	by	national	sovereigns,	which	could	be	more	favorable	to	a	plural	conception	of	property	and	disrupt	wealth	maximization.	The	second	approach	focuses	instead	on	facts	that	can	give	rise	to	state	representations	and	foreign	investor	legitimate	expectations.93	Investment	arbitrators	follow	this	second	approach	when	they	apply	the	doctrine	of	legitimate	expectations	under	the	FET.	They	lean	on	a	reliance-based	





















	 Presently,	some	tribunals	have	adopted	a	more	restrictive	approach	to	the	issue	of	representations.	Recent	awards	are	stricter	when	it	comes	to	the	specificity	of	the	acts	that	can	serve	as	a	basis	for	legitimate	expectations.	State	representations	need	to	be	directed	at	the	foreign	investor.	Arbitrators,	however,	continue	to	extract	expectations	from	implicit	representations,	which	can	emerge	from	person-to-person	meetings	or	general	legislation.108				 To	be	protected,	in	addition,	foreign	investor	reliance	needs	to	be	relevant	to	the	specific	investment	project,	such	that	no	rational	foreign	investor	would	have	invested	without	being	assured	of,	for	instance,	the	possibility	of	expanding	the	business	project.109	This	does	not	mean	that	investment	treaties	constitute	‘insurance	policies	against	bad	business	judgments.’110	Investment	arbitrators	do	not	protect	subjective	expectations	of	profit.	They	only	protect	investment	decisions	that	result	in	profitable	projects.	It	can	be	argued,	in	this	regard,	that	the	economic	viability	of	the	project	is	a	fundamental	criterion	to	determine	whether	the	expectation	is	objective	and	legitimate.	Investment	tribunals	assess	whether	the	project	was	economically	viable	in	the	concrete	social,	political,	and	economic	context.111		 When	it	comes	to	specifying	foreign	investor	legitimate	expectations,	in	short,	what	are	important	are	the	views	of	the	rational	foreign	investor,	and	not	the	views	of	the	host	state	or	local	actors.	Investment	arbitrators	apply	the	reliance	theory	in	a	one-sided	manner.	They	privilege	foreign	investor	trust	and	certainty,	but	at	the	expense	of	the	certainty	and	trust	of	locals	on	their	own	rights	and	institutions.112	This	carries	important	consequences	in	a	world	where	the	competition	to	attract	foreign	investment	shapes	state	attitudes.	States	take	measures	to	attract	foreign	investors,	but	this	may	not	be	because	they	want	to	be	bound	in	the	long	term.	They	may	be	trying	to	sell	their	location	as	any	market	actor	would	do.	This	is	what	a	neoliberal	development	policy	promotes,	and	it	is	not	very	different	from	what	foreign	investors	do.	They	try	to	convince	state	authorities	that	their	investment	projects	will	create	more	jobs	or	improve	living	standards.	Expectations,	in	other	words,	run	both	ways.	But	while	host	states	need	to	behave	according	to	foreign	investor	expectations,	foreign	investors	have	few	concerns	about	
																																								 																				108	Continental	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/9,	5	September	2008,	Award,	¶	261;	El	
Paso	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/15,	31	October	2011,	Award,	¶¶	375-8.	109	Lemire	v.	Ukraine,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/06/18,	14	January	2010,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction	and	Liability,	¶¶	265-71,	371	(and	dissent	of	Jürgen	Voss).	110	Maffezini	v.	Spain,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/97/7,	13	November	2000,	Award,	¶	64.	111	EDF	v.	Romania,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/05/13,	8	October	2009,	Award,	¶	219;	Duke	v.	
Ecuador,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/04/19,	18	August	2008,	Award,	¶	340.	112	See	Reynolds,	supra	note	99,	340-1.	
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creating	the	promised	jobs	or	improving	living	standards	(Host	states	and	local	actors	cannot	enforce	these	promises).				4.	Foreign	investor	rights	and	local	expectations	When	applying	the	legitimate	expectations	doctrine,	the	arbitral	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights	clashes	with	a	plural	understanding	of	property	and	a	will	theory	of	contracts.	Yet,	it	is	consistent	with	the	purpose	of	foreign	investor	rights.	Many	authors	criticize	reliance	because	freedom	of	contracts	requires	freedom	from	contracts.	From	a	libertarian	perspective,	the	argument	is	that	intention	should	be	the	only	source	of	obligations.113	From	a	progressive	standpoint,	the	claim	is	that	the	law	should	concern	itself	with	the	fairness	of	the	bargains.114	But	for	those	who	defend	the	use	of	legitimate	expectations	in	investment	arbitration,	reliance	is	necessary	to	meet	the	‘requirements	of	a	continuum	and	increased	international	flows	of	capital.’115	This	does	not	mean	that	arbitrators	are	unaware	of	the	doctrinal	problems	of	legitimate	expectations.	Investment	arbitrators	enforce	foreign	investor	legitimate	expectations	against	host	states	as	if	they	were	strong	property	rights,	but	refer	to	these	expectations	as	‘non-legally	binding’	or	‘less	than	rights.’116			 This	interpretative	outcome	represents	a	form	of	judicial	interventionism.	By	applying	reliance	in	a	one-sided	manner,	investment	tribunals	are	intervening	in	foreign	investment	relations	to	maximize	foreign	investor	reliance	on	host	state	representations.117	This	overlooks	that	maximizing	foreign	investor	reliance	comes	with	a	cost.	Strengthening	foreign	investor	rights	affects	host	state	sovereignty	and	the	rights	of	locals.	Given	that	foreign	investors	are	usually	sophisticated	business	actors,	the	protection	of	their	reliance	(and	not	the	reliance	of	local	actors)	requires	a	strong	justification.	From	a	progressive	view,	reliance	can	serve	to	protect	those	
																																								 																				113	R	Barnett,	‘The	Sound	of	Silence:	default	rules	and	contractual	consent,’	78	Virginia	Law	
Review	(1992)	828.	114	J	Singer,	No	Freedom	Without	Regulation:	The	Hidden	Lesson	of	the	Subprime	Crisis	(Yale	UP,	2015),	58-94.	115	Dolzer,	supra	note	104,	580.	116	El	Paso	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/15,	31	October	2011,	Award,	¶	376;	CMS	v.	
Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/01/8,	25	September	2007,	Annulment	Decision,	¶	89;	Grand	
River	v.	U.S.A.,	UNCITRAL	–	NAFTA,	12	January	2011,	Award,	¶	140.	See	also	Mairal,	‘Legitimate	Expectations	and	Informal	Administrative	Representations,’	in	S.	Schill	(ed.)	
International	Investment	Law	and	Comparative	Public	Law	(2010)	422.	117	See	S	Smith,	Contract	Theory	(Oxford	UP,	2004)	44	(and	footnote	5).	Similarly,	C	Fried,	
Contract	As	Promise:	A	Theory	of	Contractual	Obligation	(Harvard	UP,	1981);	P	S	Atiyah,	The	
Rise	and	Fall	of	Freedom	of	Contract	(Oxford	UP,	1979).		
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who	are	vulnerable,	but	this	argument	would	rarely	apply	in	the	case	of	MNCs.118		 In	international	investment	law,	the	justification	for	one-sided	reliance	is	that	foreign	investment	can	promote	economic	prosperity.	This	is	why	foreign	investment	should	not	‘depend	upon	the	subtleties	and	niceties’	of	host	governments	and	local	actors.119	But	this	interpretative	attitude	deals	in	a	formalistic	manner	with	two	central	issues.	First,	it	overlooks	the	distribution	of	the	benefits	and	costs	of	foreign	investment.	There	is	a	lot	at	stake	in	infrastructure,	extractive	and	other	large	economic	projects.	Secondly,	it	does	not	take	local	expectations	seriously.	The	emphasis	on	foreign	investment	as	a	means	to	maximize	wealth	is	only	legitimate	if	we	assume	the	validity	of	an	economic	view	of	individuals	and	communities.120	The	problem	with	this	interpretative	attitude,	which	dominates	investment	awards,	is	that	it	assumes	that	every	state	and	community	is	‘subject	to	an	obligatory	end,	namely,	the	pursuit	of	economic	rationality.’121			
Conclusions	In	this	article,	I	have	argued	that	investment	arbitrators	play	a	fundamental	role	in	the	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights.	When	tribunals	apply	the	FET,	they	specify	foreign	investor	rights	using	the	legitimate	expectations	doctrine	according	to	international	law.	Relying	on	property	theory,	I	have	contrasted	this	interpretation	against	wealth	maximization	and	propriety.	The	legal	reasoning	in	most	awards	promotes	the	calculations	of	foreign	investors	as	a	means	towards	economic	prosperity.	Foreign	investor	rights	and	their	calculations	serve	the	purpose	of	wealth	maximization.	This	leads	arbitrators	to	frame	foreign	investment	relations	in	transactional	terms,	where	the	interpretation	of	foreign	investment	bargains	plays	a	fundamental	role.			 In	this	transactional	view,	investment	tribunals	take	the	perspective	of	the	foreign	investor,	i.e.	a	global	absent	owner,	who	is	interested	in	carrying	out	specific	economic	activities,	earning	the	expected	profit,	and	moving	on	to	the	next	investment	opportunity.	The	problem	of	this	outcome	is	not	that	wealth	maximization	is	unimportant.	Some	economic	prosperity	is	necessary	for	maintaining	community.	It	is	rather	that	tribunals	overlook	
																																								 																				118	See	M	Trebilcock	and	S	Elliott,	‘The	Scope	and	Limits	of	Legal	Paternalism:	altruism	and	coercion	in	family	financial	arrangements,’	in	P	Benson	(ed.)	The	Theory	of	Contract	Law	(2001)	45;	Bant	&	Bryan,	supra	note	97,	19-21.	Kennedy	reviews	different	policy	reasons	for	a	reliance	approach	in	Kennedy,	supra	note	97,	157,	164,	171.			119	Thunderbird	v.	Mexico,	UNCITRAL	(NAFTA),	1	December	2005,	Separate	Opinion	of	Thomas	Wälde,	¶	47.	120	Teubner,	supra	note	73,	67;	Zumbansen,	supra	note	74,	231.	121	P	Benson,	‘The	Idea	of	a	Public	Basis	of	Justification	for	Contract,’	33	Osgoode	Hall	Law	
Journal	(1995)	273,	335.	
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that	foreign	investor	rights	are	also	about	local	preferences,	i.e.	propriety.	Local	actors	have	economic	as	well	as	non-economic	expectations	for	the	resources.	The	current	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights	often	disregards	these	local	preferences,	giving	rise	to	a	conception	of	property	that	can	be	described	as	a	global	right	to	investment.			 Investment	tribunals	could	interpret	foreign	investor	rights	differently.	There	is	nothing	in	the	treaties	against	a	more	plural	interpretation	of	these	rights.	To	start	with,	arbitrators	could	follow	those	who	claim	that	legitimate	expectations	should	play	no	role	in	investment	arbitration.	Today,	this	includes	the	United	States.	Unless	there	is	a	clear	contractual	commitment,	tribunals	could	rely	only	on	domestic	law	to	specify	foreign	investor	rights,	whether	in	the	form	of	acquired	rights,	vested	rights,	or	legitimate	expectations.	This	would	provide	more	certainty	to	states	and	local	actors	to	decide	the	terms	they	want	to	offer	foreign	investors,	promoting	as	much	freedom	of	contracts	as	from	contracts.	The	international	investment	regime	should	also	concern	itself	with	the	fairness	of	foreign	investment	bargains.	After	all,	an	offer	to	create	specific	property	entitlements,	like	a	license	to	produce	oil	or	gas,	is	a	very	serious	offer	that	governments	make	on	behalf	of	the	public.			
